Cassazione civile , sez. III, sentenza 26.10.2009 n° 22597
Con la sentenza n. 22597 del 26.10.2009, la terza sezione della Corte di Cassazione interviene a regolare una questione procedurale di frequente verificazione in seno ai giudizi aventi ad oggetto il risarcimento dei danni derivanti dalla circolazione stradale enunciando un principio che, se pur riferito all’art. 22, l. n. 990/69 – applicabile ratione temporis ai fatti di causa – è senz’altro applicabile sotto l’attuale vigenza dell’art. 145 of Code of Private Insurance .
The scheme used as a reference by case is typical where the owner and / or driver of a vehicle in court cite the vehicle owner's insurance company and antagonist of the latter. Defendant, on the merits, without having first applied for compensation by registered letter to the insurance company of the actor, makes a counterclaim for damages against the actor himself, who - as a result - call your insurer as collateral.
In this case, however, in the conclusions of the defendant in counterclaim had extended its application also damages the insurer counterparty exercising essentially direct action.
The Supreme Court declares the counterclaim impossible, given by the defendant directly against the company by the applicant, why not preceded by the letter of formal notice and the course of the canons of sixty days spatium deliberandi. Until now nothing
quaestio: pronunciation, in fact, grafts in the consolidated case-law according to which, for the purposes of proposability, direct action against the insurer should always be preceded by the letter of formal notice, even assuming that is exercised in the form of counterclaim.
preparing the solution to the case in previous rulings on the proposed action, however, predicted that, without the improponibilità direct action against the insurance company, even when exercised by way of counterclaim, however, remained fully accepted, claims for damages filed by the defendant in against the actor under the general rule established by art. 2054 cc, and the consequent demand for security proposed by the latter against its insurance company.
On this point, the principle enunciated by Supreme 22597/09 is extremely innovative.
The Supreme Court, states:
"the condition for proposing the application (...) works both in the case of direct action (...) that the assumption of tort liability action, pursuant to article 2054 cod. civ ..
fact that condition is set for proposing the law without distinction of persons against whom action is proposed, individually or cumulatively.
should, in principle, be dismissed as impractical the demand made under article 2054 cod. Civ. against the owner and driver of the vehicle if it has not been promoted beyond a period of sixty days from the claim to the insurer rca "
according to the judges of Piazza Cavour, in other words, chi sia stato convenuto in giudizio per il risarcimento dei danni derivanti dalla circolazione stradale in relazione di un sinistro riconducibile all’area di applicazione dell’assicurazione obbligatoria, non può in nessun caso proporre una propria domanda di risarcimento danni in via riconvenzionale, se non ha preventivamente messo in mora la compagnia di assicurazione della controparte e non sia decorso il termine dilatorio previsto dall’art. 145 Cod. Ass..
La domanda riconvenzionale, in particolare, non potrà essere esercitata neppure nei confronti del proprietario e conducente sulla base delle regole ordinarie stabilite dall’art. 2054 c.c., in quanto a quest’ultimo – sembra potersi desumere dal tenore della decisione della Corte – sarebbe inibita, in assenza di regolare messa in mora della propria compagnia di assicurazione e del decorso del predetto termine, finanche la domanda di garanzia.
Si tratta, come è evidente, di un principio rivoluzionario, nella misura in cui afferma e riconosce a chiare lettere, in definitiva, che la disciplina dettata in tema di assicurazione obbligatoria e di azione diretta introduce una deroga alle regole generali che presidiano il sistema della responsabilità civile e, conseguentemente, le ordinarie regole del processo.
La conclusione alla quale giunge la Corte di Cassazione apre molteplici questioni, anche di teoria generale del diritto e del processo, che meritano senz’altro grande approfondimento.
The scheme used as a reference by case is typical where the owner and / or driver of a vehicle in court cite the vehicle owner's insurance company and antagonist of the latter. Defendant, on the merits, without having first applied for compensation by registered letter to the insurance company of the actor, makes a counterclaim for damages against the actor himself, who - as a result - call your insurer as collateral.
In this case, however, in the conclusions of the defendant in counterclaim had extended its application also damages the insurer counterparty exercising essentially direct action.
The Supreme Court declares the counterclaim impossible, given by the defendant directly against the company by the applicant, why not preceded by the letter of formal notice and the course of the canons of sixty days spatium deliberandi. Until now nothing
quaestio: pronunciation, in fact, grafts in the consolidated case-law according to which, for the purposes of proposability, direct action against the insurer should always be preceded by the letter of formal notice, even assuming that is exercised in the form of counterclaim.
preparing the solution to the case in previous rulings on the proposed action, however, predicted that, without the improponibilità direct action against the insurance company, even when exercised by way of counterclaim, however, remained fully accepted, claims for damages filed by the defendant in against the actor under the general rule established by art. 2054 cc, and the consequent demand for security proposed by the latter against its insurance company.
On this point, the principle enunciated by Supreme 22597/09 is extremely innovative.
The Supreme Court, states:
"the condition for proposing the application (...) works both in the case of direct action (...) that the assumption of tort liability action, pursuant to article 2054 cod. civ ..
fact that condition is set for proposing the law without distinction of persons against whom action is proposed, individually or cumulatively.
should, in principle, be dismissed as impractical the demand made under article 2054 cod. Civ. against the owner and driver of the vehicle if it has not been promoted beyond a period of sixty days from the claim to the insurer rca "
according to the judges of Piazza Cavour, in other words, chi sia stato convenuto in giudizio per il risarcimento dei danni derivanti dalla circolazione stradale in relazione di un sinistro riconducibile all’area di applicazione dell’assicurazione obbligatoria, non può in nessun caso proporre una propria domanda di risarcimento danni in via riconvenzionale, se non ha preventivamente messo in mora la compagnia di assicurazione della controparte e non sia decorso il termine dilatorio previsto dall’art. 145 Cod. Ass..
La domanda riconvenzionale, in particolare, non potrà essere esercitata neppure nei confronti del proprietario e conducente sulla base delle regole ordinarie stabilite dall’art. 2054 c.c., in quanto a quest’ultimo – sembra potersi desumere dal tenore della decisione della Corte – sarebbe inibita, in assenza di regolare messa in mora della propria compagnia di assicurazione e del decorso del predetto termine, finanche la domanda di garanzia.
Si tratta, come è evidente, di un principio rivoluzionario, nella misura in cui afferma e riconosce a chiare lettere, in definitiva, che la disciplina dettata in tema di assicurazione obbligatoria e di azione diretta introduce una deroga alle regole generali che presidiano il sistema della responsabilità civile e, conseguentemente, le ordinarie regole del processo.
La conclusione alla quale giunge la Corte di Cassazione apre molteplici questioni, anche di teoria generale del diritto e del processo, che meritano senz’altro grande approfondimento.
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